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Abstract
In this article we adapt the existing account of class-forcing over a
ZFC model to a model (M, C) of Morse-Kelley class theory. We give a
rigorous definition of class-forcing in such a model and show that the
Definability Lemma (and the Truth Lemma) can be proven without
restricting the notion of forcing. Furthermore we show under which
conditions the axioms are preserved. We conclude by proving that
Laver’s Theorem does not hold for class-forcings.
1 Introduction
The idea of considering a forcing notion with a (proper) class of conditions
instead of with a set of conditions was introduced by W. Easton in 1970.
He needed the forcing notion to be a class to prove the theorem that the
continuum function 2κ, for κ regular, can behave in any reasonable way
and as changes in the size of 2κ are bounded by the size of a set-forcing
notion, the forcing has to be a class. Two problems arise when considering
a class sized forcing: the forcing relation might not be definable in the
ground model and the extension might not preserve the axioms. This was
addressed in a general way in S.Friedman’s book (see [3]) where he presented
class forcings which are definable (with parameters) over a model 〈M,A〉.
This is called a model of ZF ifM is a model of ZF and Replacement holds in
M for formulas which mention A as a predicate. We will call such forcings
A-definable class-forcings, their generics G A-definable class-generics and
the resulting new model A-definable class-generic outer model. Friedman
showed that for such A-definable class-forcing which satisfy an additional
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condition called tameness the Definability Lemma, the Truth Lemma and
the preservation of the Axioms of ZFC hold. In this article we would like
to broaden this approach by changing the notion of ground model from a
model M of ZFC with a class A to general models of class theory with an
arbitrary collection of classes C. We choose Morse-Kelley class theory as
our underlying theory and then follow the line of [3] and restrict the forcing
notion by using the property of tameness. 1
In the following we will introduce Morse-Kelley class theory and de-
fine the relevant notions like names, interpretations and the extension for
class-forcing in Morse-Kelley. Then we will show that the forcing relation is
definable in the ground model, that the Truth Lemma holds and we charac-
terize P -generic extensions which satisfy the axioms of MK. We will show
that Laver’s Theorem fails for class-forcings.
2 Morse-Kelley Class Theory
In ZFC we can only talk about classes by using formulas as our only objects
are sets. In class theories like Morse-Kelley (MK) or Go¨del-Bernays (GB)
the language is two-sorted, i.e. the object are sets and classes and we have
corresponding quantifiers for each type of object. 2 We denote the classes
by upper case letters and sets by lower case letters, the same will hold for
class-names and set-names and so on. Hence atomic formulas for the ∈-
relation are of the form “x ∈ X” where x is a set-variable and X is a set- or
class-variable. The models M of MK are of the form 〈M,∈, C〉, where M is
a transitive model of ZFC, C the family of classes of M (i.e. every element
of C is a subset of M) and ∈ is the standard ∈ relation (from now on we will
omit mentioning this relation).
The axiomatizations of class theories which are often used and closely
related to ZFC are MK and GBC. Their axioms which are purely about sets
coincide with the corresponding ZFC axioms such as pairing and union and
1In [2] R. Chuaqui follows a similar approach and defines forcing for Morse-Kelley class
theory. However there is a significant difference between our two approaches. To show
that the extension preserves the axioms Chuaqui restricts the generic G for an arbitrary
forcing notion P in the following way: A subclass G of a notion of forcing P is strongly
P-generic over a model (M, C) of MK iff G is P -generic over (M, C) and for all ordinals
β ∈ M there is a set P ′ ∈ M such that P ′ ⊆ P and for all sequences of dense sections
〈Dα : α ∈ β〉, there is a q ∈ G satisfying
∀α(α ∈ β → ∃ p (p ∈ P ′ ∩G∧ the greatest lower bound of p and q exists
and is an element of Dα)).
where a subclass D of a partial order P is a P -section if every extension of a condition in
D is in D.
2There is also a one-sorted formulation in which the only objects are classes and sets
are defined as being classes which are elements of other classes. For reasons of clarity we
will use the two-sorted version throughout the paper.
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they share class axioms like the Global Choice Axiom. Their difference lies
in the Comprehension Axiom in the sense that GB only allows quantification
over sets whereas MK allows quantification over sets as well as classes. This
results in major differences between the two theories which can be seen for
example in their relation to ZFC: GB is a conservative extension of ZFC,
meaning that every sentence about sets that can be proved in GB could
already be proved in ZFC and so GB cannot prove “new” theorems about
ZFC. MK on the other hand can do just that, in particular MK implies
CON(ZFC) 3 and so MK is not conservative over ZFC. The consistency
strength of MK is strictly stronger than that of ZFC but lies below that of
ZFC + an inaccessible cardinal as 〈Vκ, Vκ+1〉 for κ inaccessible, is a model
for MK in ZFC.
As said above we choose MK (and not GB) as underlying theory to
define class-forcing. The reason lies mainly in the fact that within MK we
can show the Definability Lemma for class-forcing without having to restrict
the forcing notion whereas in GB this would not be possible. We use the
following axiomatization of MK:
A) Set Axioms:
1. Extensionality for sets: ∀x∀y(∀z (z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y).
2. Pairing: For any sets x and y there is a set {x, y}.
3. Infinity: There is an infinite set.
4. Union: For every set x the set
⋃
x exists.
5. Power set: For every set x the power set P (x) of x exists.
B) Class Axioms:
1. Foundation: Every nonempty class has an ∈-minimal element.
2. Extensionality for classes: ∀z (z ∈ X ↔ z ∈ Y )→ X = Y .
3. Replacement: If a class F is a function and x is a set, then
{F (z) : z ∈ x} is a set.
4. Class-Comprehension:
∀X1 . . . ∀Xn∃Y Y = {x : ϕ(x,X1, . . . ,Xn)}
where ϕ is a formula containing class parameters in which quan-
tification over both sets and classes are allowed.
5. Global Choice: There exists a global class well-ordering of the
universe of sets.
3This is because in MK we can form a Satisfaction Predicate for V and then by reflection
we get an elementary submodel Vα of V . But any such Vα models ZFC.
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There are different ways of axiomatizing MK, one of them is obtained by
using the Limitation of Size Axiom instead of Global Choice and Replace-
ment. Limitation of Size is an axiom that was introduced by von Neumann
says that for every C ∈ M, C is a proper class if and only if there is a one-
to-one function from the universe of sets to C, i.e. all the proper classes have
the same size. The two axiomatizations are equivalent: Global Choice and
Replacement follow from Limitation of size and vice versa. 4 A nontrivial
argument shows that Limitation of Size does not follow from Replacement
plus Local Choice.
In the definition of forcing we will use the following induction and recur-
sion principles:
Proposition 1 (Induction). Let (Ord,R) be a well-founded relation and
ϕ(α) a property of an ordinal α. Then it holds that
∀α ∈ Ord ((∀β ∈ Ord (β Rα→ ϕ(β)))→ ϕ(α)) → ∀α ∈ Ordϕ(α)
Proof. Otherwise, as R is well-founded, there exists an R-minimal element
α of Ord such that ¬ϕ(α). That is a contradiction.
Proposition 2 (Recursion). For every well-founded binary relation (Ord,R)
and every formula ϕ(X,Y ) satisfying ∀X ∃!Y ϕ(X,Y ), there is a unique bi-
nary relation S on Ord × V such that for every α ∈ Ord it holds that
ϕ(S<α, Sα) holds, where Sα = {x | (α, x) ∈ S} and S<α = {(β, x) ∈ S |βRα}.
Proof. By induction on α it holds that for each γ there exists a unique binary
relation Sγ on Ord<γ × V , where Ord<γ = {β ∈ Ord |βRγ}, such that
ϕ(Sγ<α, S
γ
α) holds for all αRγ. Then it follows from Class-Comprehension
that we can take S =
⋃
γ∈Ord Sγ.
3 Generics, Names and the Extension
To lay out forcing in MK we have to redefine the basic notions like names,
interpretation of names etc. to arrive at the definition of the forcing exten-
sion. As we work in a two-sorted theory we will define these notions for
sets and classes respectively. Let us start with the definition of the forcing
notions and its generics. We use the notation (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ C to mean
Xi ∈ C for all i.
Definition 3. Let P ∈ C and ≤P ∈ C be a partial ordering with greatest
element 1P . We call (P,≤P ) ∈ C an (M, C)-forcing and often abbreviate it
by writing P . With the above convention (P,≤P ) ∈ C means that P and ≤P
4This is because Global Choice is equivalent with the statement that every proper class
is bijective with the ordinals.
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are in C.
G ⊆ P is P -generic over (M, C) if
1. G is compatible: If p, q ∈ G then for some r, r ≤ p and r ≤ q.
2. G is upwards closed: p ≥ q ∈ G → p ∈ G.
3. G ∩D 6= ∅ whenever D ⊆ P is dense, D ∈ C.
Note that from now on we will assumeM to be countable (and transitive)
and C to be countable to ensure that for each p ∈ P there exists G such that
p ∈ G and G is P -generic.
We build the hierarchy of names for sets and classes in the following way
(we will use capital greek letters for class-names and lower case greek letters
for set-names):
Definition 4.
N s0 = ∅.
N sα+1 = {σ : σ is a subset of N
s
α × P in M}.
N sλ =
⋃
{N sα : α < λ}, if λ is a limit ordinal.
N s =
⋃
{N sα : α ∈ ORD(M)} is the class of all set-names of P.
N = {Σ : Σ is a subclass of N s × P in C}.
Note that the N sα (for α > 0) are in fact proper classes and therefore
Definition 4 is an inductive definition of a sequence of proper classes of length
the ordinals. The fact that with this definition we stay inside C follows from
Proposition 2.
Lemma 5.
a) If α ≤ β then N sα ⊆ N
s
β .
b) N s ⊆ N .
Proof. a) By induction on β. For β = 0 there is nothing to prove.
Successor step β → β+1. Assume N sα ⊆ N
s
β for all α ≤ β. Let τ ∈ N
s
α
for some α < β+1. Then we know by assumption that τ ∈ N sβ . So by
Definition 4 there is some γ < β such that τ = {〈πi, pi〉 | i ∈ I} where
for each i ∈ I, πi ∈ N
s
γ and pi ∈ P . By assumption πi ∈ N
s
β for all
i ∈ I and so τ ∈ N sβ+1.
Limit step λ. Assume N sα ⊆ N
s
β for all α ≤ β < λ. But by Definition
4, σ ∈ N sλ iff σ ∈ N
s
β for some β < λ and so it follows that N
s
α ⊆ N
s
λ
for all α ≤ λ.
3 GENERICS, NAMES AND THE EXTENSION 6
b) By Definition 4, Σ ∈ N iff Σ is a subclass of N s × P iff for every
〈τ, p〉 ∈ Σ, τ ∈ N s and p ∈ P iff for every 〈τ, p〉 ∈ Σ there is an ordinal
α such that τ ∈ N sα and p ∈ P . Let σ ∈ N
s, i.e. there is an ordinal β
such that σ ∈ N sβ . Then it holds that for every 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ there is an
ordinal α < β such that τ ∈ N sα and p ∈ P . So σ ∈ N .
We define the interpretations of set- and class-names recursively.
Definition 6.
σG = {τG : ∃p ∈ G(〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ)} for σ ∈ N s.
ΣG = {σG : ∃p ∈ G(〈σ, p〉 ∈ Σ)} for Σ ∈ N .
According to the definitions above we define the extension of an MK
model (M, C) to be the extension of the set part and the extension of the
class part:
Definition 7. (M, C)[G] = (M [G], C[G]) = ({σG : σ ∈ N s}, {ΣG : Σ ∈ N}).
Definition 8. If P is a partial order with greatest element 1P , we define
the canonical P -names of x ∈M and C ∈ C:
xˇ = {〈yˇ, 1P 〉 | y ∈ x}.
Cˇ = {〈xˇ, 1P 〉 |x ∈ C}.
From these definitions the basic facts of forcing follow easily:
Lemma 9. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of MK, where M is a transitive
model of ZFC and C the family of classes of M. Then it holds that:
a) ∀x ∈M(xˇ ∈ N s ∧ xˇG = x) and ∀C ∈ C(Cˇ ∈ N ∧ CˇG = C).
b) (M, C) ⊆ (M, C)[G] in the sense that M ⊆M [G] and C ⊆ C[G].
c) G ∈ (M, C)[G], i.e. G ∈ C[G]
d) M [G] is transitive and Ord(M [G])) = Ord(M).
e) If (N, C′) is a model of MK, M ⊆ N , C ⊆ C′, G ∈ C′ then (M, C)[G] ⊆
(N, C′).
Proof. a): Using Definition 6 and Definition 8 we can easily show this by
induction.
b): follows immediately from 1.
c): Let Γ = {〈pˇ, p〉 : p ∈ P}. Then this is a name for G as ΓG = {pˇG | p ∈
G} = {p | p ∈ G} = G.
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d) It follows from Definition 6 and Definition 7 that M [G] is transitive.
For every σ ∈ N s the rank of σG is at most rank σ, so Ord(M)[G]) ⊆
Ord(M).
e) For each name Σ ∈ N , Σ ∈ (M, C) and therefore Σ ∈ (N, C′). As
G ∈ C′ the interpretation of Σ in (M, C)[G] is the same as in (N, C′).
4 Definability and Truth Lemmas
We will define the forcing relation and show that it is definable in the ground
model and how it relates to truth in the extension. The main focus will be
the Definability Lemma, since it now is possible to prove that it holds for
all forcing notions in contrast to A-definable class-forcings in a ZFC setting.
Note that when we talk about a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xm,X1, . . . ,Xn) we mean
ϕ to be a second-order formula that allows second-order quantification and
we always assume the model (M, C) to be countable.
Definition 10. Suppose p belongs to P , ϕ(x1, . . . , xm,X1, . . . ,Xn) is a for-
mula, σ1, . . . , σm are set-names and Σ1, . . . ,Σn are class-names. We write
p  ϕ(σ1, . . . , σm,Σ1, . . . ,Σn) iff whenever G ⊆ P is P -generic over (M, C)
and p ∈ P , we have (M, C)[G] |= ϕ(σG1 , . . . , σ
G
m,Σ
G
1 , . . . ,Σ
G
n ).
Lemma 11 (Definability Lemma). For any ϕ, the relation “p  ϕ(σ1, . . . , σm,Σ1, . . . ,Σn)”
of p, ~σ, ~Σ is definable in (M, C).
Lemma 12 (Truth Lemma). If G is P -generic over (M, C) then
(M, C)[G] |= ϕ(σG1 , . . . , σ
G
m,Σ
G
1 , . . . ,Σ
G
n )⇔ ∃p ∈ G (p  ϕ(σ1, . . . , σm,Σ1, . . . ,Σn)).
Following the approach of set-forcing we introduce a new relation ∗ and
prove the Definability and Truth Lemma for this ∗. Then we will show that
∗ equals the intended forcing relation .
The definition of ∗ consists of ten cases: six cases for atomic formulas,
where the first two are for set-names, the second two for the “hybrid” of
set- and class-names and the last two for class-names, one for ∧ and ¬
respectively and two quantifier cases, one for first-order and one for second-
order quantification. Of course formally there are only two cases for atomic
formulas, namely case five and six of Definition 14. But by splitting the cases
we can see very easily that it is enough to prove the Definability Lemma
for set-names only (case one and two in the Definition) and then infer the
general Definability Lemma by induction.
Definition 13. D ⊆ P is dense below p if ∀q ≤ p ∃r (r ≤ q, r ∈ D).
Definition 14. Let σ, γ, π be elements of N s and Σ,Γ elements of N .
4 DEFINABILITY AND TRUTH LEMMAS 8
1. p ∗ σ ∈ γ iff {q : ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ γ such that q ≤ r, q ∗ π = σ} is dense
below p.
2. p ∗ σ = γ iff for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ γ, p ∗ (π ∈ σ ↔ π ∈ γ).
3. p ∗ σ ∈ Σ iff {q : ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ such that q ≤ r, q ∗ π = σ} is dense
below p.
4. p ∗ σ = Σ iff for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ Σ, p ∗ (π ∈ σ ↔ π ∈ Σ).
5. p ∗ Σ ∈ Γ iff {q : ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ Γ such that q ≤ r, q ∗ π = Σ} is dense
below p.
6. p ∗ Σ = Γ iff for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ, p ∗ (π ∈ Σ↔ π ∈ Γ).
7. p ∗ ϕ ∧ ψ iff p ∗ ϕ and p ∗ ψ.
8. p ∗ ¬ϕ iff ∀q ≤ p (¬ q ∗ ϕ).
9. p ∗ ∀xϕ iff for all σ, p ∗ ϕ(σ).
10. p ∗ ∀Xϕ iff for all Σ, p ∗ ϕ(Σ).
We have to show that ∗ is definable within the ground model. For
this it is enough to concentrate on the first two of the above cases, because
we can reduce the definability of the ∗-relation for arbitrary second-order
formulas to its definability for atomic formulas σ ∈ τ , σ = τ , where σ and
τ are set-names. The rest of the cases then follow by induction. So let us
restate Lemma 12 for the case of ∗ and set-names:
Lemma 15 (Definability Lemma for the atomic cases of set-names). The
relation “p ∗ ϕ(σ, τ)” is definable in (M, C) for ϕ = “σ ∈ τ” and ϕ = “σ =
τ”.
Proof. We will show by induction5 on β ∈ ORD that there are unique
classes Xβ, Yβ ⊆ β ×M which define the 
∗-relation for the first two cases
of Definition 14 in the following way: for all α < β, Rα = (Xβ)α, Sα = (Yβ)α
where (Xβ)α = {x | 〈α, x〉 ∈ Xβ} and
Rα = {(p, σ,∈, τ) | p ∈ P, σ and τ are set P -names, (⋆)
rank(σ) and rank(τ) < α, for all q ≤ p
there is q′ ≤ q and 〈π, r〉 ∈ τ such that
q′ ≤ r and (q′, π,=, σ) ∈ Sα}
and
5To show how this induction works in the context of a class-theory we will not simply
use Proposition 1 and 2, but rather give the complete construction.
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Sα = {(p, σ,=, τ) | p ∈ P, σ and τ are set P -names, (⋆⋆)
rank(σ) and rank(τ) < α,
for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ τ such that
(p, π,∈, σ) ∈ Rα iff (p, π,∈, τ) ∈ Rα}
To show that Xβ and Yβ are definable we will define the classes Rα
and Sα at each step by recursion on the tupel (p, σ, e, τ) according to the
following well-founded partial order on P ×N s × {“ ∈ ”, “ = ”} × N s.
Definition 16. Suppose (p, σ, e, τ), (q, σ′ , e′, τ ′) ∈ P × N s × {“ ∈ ”, “ =
”} × N s. Say that (q, σ′, e′, τ ′) < (p, σ, e, τ)if
• max(rank(σ′, τ ′)) < max(rank(σ, τ)), or
• max(rank(σ′, τ ′)) = max(rank(σ, τ)), and rank(σ) ≥ rank(τ) but
rank(σ′) < rank(τ ′), or
• max(rank(σ′, τ ′)) = max(rank(σ, τ)), and rank(σ) ≥ rank(τ) ↔
rank(σ′) ≥ rank(τ ′), and e is “=” and e′ is “∈”.
Note that clause 1 and 2 of Definition 14 always reduce the <-rank of
the members of P ×N s × {“ ∈ ”, “ = ”} × N s.
“Successor step β → β + 1.” We know that there are unique classes
Xβ, Yβ such that for all α < β, Rα = (Xβ)α, Sα = (Yβ)α and (⋆) and (⋆⋆)
hold. We want to show that there are unique classes Xβ+1, Yβ+1 such that
for all α < β + 1, Rα = (Xβ+1)α, Sα = (Yβ+1)α and (⋆) and (⋆⋆) hold. So
let for all α < β (Xβ+1)α = (Xβ)α = Rα and (Yβ+1)α = (Yβ)α = Sα and
define (Xβ+1)β = Rβ and (Yβ+1)β = Sβ uniquely as follows:
A) (p, σ,“∈”, τ) ∈ Rβ if and only if for all q ≤ p there is q
′ ≤ q and
〈π, r〉 ∈ τ such that q′ ≤ r and (q′, π,“=”, σ) ∈ Sβ.
B) (p, σ,“=”, τ) ∈ Sβ if and only if for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ σ ∪ τ : (p, π,“∈”, σ) ∈
Rβ iff (p, π,“∈”, τ) ∈ Rβ .
These definitions clearly satisfy (⋆) and (⋆⋆) and to see that they are indeed
inductive definitions over the well-order defined in Definition 16, we consider
the following three cases for each of the definitions A) and B):
1. rank(σ) < rank(τ)
2. rank(τ) < rank(σ)
3. rank(σ) = rank(τ)
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Ad A.1: (q′, π,“=”, σ) < (p, σ,“∈”, τ) because rank(σ), rank(π) < rank(τ)
(first clause of Denfition 16).
Ad A.2: (q′, π,“=”, σ) < (p, σ,“∈”, τ) because max(rank(π), rank(σ)) =
max(rank(σ), rank(τ)) and rank(σ) ≥ rank(τ) and rank(π) < rank(σ) (sec-
ond clause of Definition 16).
Ad A.3: (q′, π,“=”, σ) < (p, σ,“∈”, τ) because max(rank(π), rank(σ)) =
max(rank(σ), rank(τ)) and rank(σ) ≥ rank(τ) and rank(π) < rank(σ) =
rank(τ) (second clause of Definition 16).
Ad B.1: (p, π,“∈”, σ) < (p, σ,“=”, τ) because rank(σ), rank(π) < rank(τ)
and (p, π,“∈”, τ) < (p, σ,“=”, τ) because max(rank(π), rank(τ)) = max(rank(σ), rank(τ))
and rank(σ) < rank(τ) and rank(π) < rank(τ) (third clause of Definition
16).
Ad B.2: (p, π,“∈”, σ) < (p, σ,“=”, τ) because of the second clause of
Definition 16 and (p, π,“∈”, τ) < (p, σ,“=”, τ) because rank(π), rank(τ) <
rank(σ).
Ad B.3: (p, π,“∈”, σ) < (p, σ,“=”, τ) and (p, π,“∈”, τ) < (p, σ,“=”, τ)
because max(rank(π), rank(τ)) = max(rank(σ), rank(τ)) and rank(σ) ≥
rank(τ) and rank(π) < rank(σ), rank(τ) (both second clause of Definition
16).
“Limit step λ.” We know that for every β < λ there are unique classes
Xβ, Yβ such that for all α < β, Rα = (Xβ)α, Sα = (Yβ)α and (⋆) and (⋆⋆)
hold. We have to show that there are unique classes Xλ, Yλ ⊆ λ ×M , λ
limit, such that for all β < λ, Rβ = (Xλ)β , Sβ = (Yλ)β and (⋆) and (⋆⋆)
hold respectively. We define the required classes as follows:
〈α, x〉 ∈ Xλ ↔∃〈〈Rγ , Sγ〉 | γ ≤ α〉 ∃X,Y ((∀γ ≤ α((X)γ = Rγ and
(Y )γ = Sγ and they satisfy (⋆) and (⋆⋆) resp.)∧
(x ∈ (X)γ for some γ ≤ α))
〈α, x〉 ∈ Yλ ↔∃〈〈Rγ , Sγ〉 | γ ≤ α〉 ∃X,Y ((∀γ ≤ α((X)γ = Rγ and
(Y )γ = Sγ and they satisfy (⋆) and (⋆⋆) resp.)∧
(x ∈ (Y )γ for some γ ≤ α))
From the proof of the successor step we see that the sequence 〈〈Rγ , Sγ〉 | γ ≤
α〉 is unique for every α < λ and therefore Xλ, Yλ are also unique. This defi-
nition is possible only in Morse-Kelly with its version of Class-Comprehension
and not in Go¨del-Bernays, because we are quantifying over class variables
(in fact we only need ∆11 Class-Comprehension).
The general Definability Lemma now follows immediately from this Lemma
and Definition 14. We now turn to the Truth Lemma.
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In the following a capital greek letter denotes a name from N (and
therefore can be a set- or a class-name), whereas a lower case greek letter is
a name from N s (and therefore can only be a set-name).
Lemma 17.
a) If p ∗ ϕ and q ≤ p then q ∗ ϕ
b) If {p | q ∗ ϕ} is dense below p then p ∗ ϕ.
c) If ¬p ∗ ϕ then ∃q ≤ p(q ∗ ¬ϕ).
Proof. a) By induction on ϕ: Let ϕ be Σ ∈ Γ, then by Definition 4 D =
{q′ : ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ Γ such that q′ ≤ r, q′ ∗ π = Σ} is dense below p. Then for
all q ≤ p, D is also dense below q and therefore q ∗ ϕ. The other cases
follow easily.
b) By induction on ϕ. Let ϕ be Σ ∈ Γ and {q | q ∗ Σ ∈ Γ} is dense
below p. From Definition 14 it follows that {q | {s : ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ Γ such that s ≤
r, s ∗ π = Σ} is dense below q} is dense below p and from a well-known
fact it follows that D = {s : ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ Γ such that s ≤ r, s ∗ π = Σ} is
dense below p. Again by Definition 14 we get as desired p ∗ Σ ∈ Γ.
The other cases follow easily; for the case of negation we will use the fact
that if {p | q ∗ ¬ϕ} is dense below p then ∀q ≤ p(¬q ∗ ϕ), using a).
c) follows directly from b).
Now, the proofs for the Truth Lemma and ∗= follow similarly to the
proofs in set-forcing (note that a name Σ ∈ N can also be a set-name and
therefore we don’t need to mention the cases for set-names explicitly):
Lemma 18 (Truth Lemma). If G is P -generic then
(M, C)[G] |= ϕ(ΣG1 , . . . ,Σ
G
m)⇔ ∃p ∈ G (p 
∗ ϕ(Σ1, . . . ,Σm)).
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
Σ ∈ Γ. “→” Assume ΣG ∈ ΓG then choose a 〈π, r〉 ∈ Γ such that ΣG = πG
and r ∈ G. By induction there is a p ∈ G with p ≤ r and p ∗ π = Σ.
Then for all q ≤ p, q ∗ π = Σ and by Definition 4 p ∗ Σ ∈ Γ.
“←”: Assume ∃p ∈ G(p ∗ Σ ∈ Γ). Then {q : ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ τ such that q ≤
r, q ∗ σ = π} = D is dense below p and so by genericity G∩D 6= ∅. So
there is a q ∈ G, q ≤ p such that ∃〈π, r〉 ∈ Γ with q ≤ r, q ∗ π = Σ.
By induction πG = ΣG and as r ≥ q, r ∈ G and therefore πG ∈ ΓG.
So ΣG ∈ ΓG.
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Σ = Γ. “→” Assume σG = ΓG. Then for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ with r ∈ G it
holds that πG ∈ ΣG ↔ πG ∈ ΓG. Let D = {p | either p ∗ Σ =
Γ or for some 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ, p ∗ ¬(π ∈ Σ ↔ π ∈ Γ)}. Then D
is dense: By contradiction, let q ∈ P and assume that there is no
p ≤ q such that p ∈ D. But if there is no p ≤ q such that for
some 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ, p ∗ ¬(π ∈ Σ ↔ π ∈ Γ)} then by Lemma 17
q ∗ (π ∈ Σ↔ π ∈ Γ) for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ and therefore q ∗ Σ = Γ.
So there is a p ≤ q such that p ∈ D. Since the filter G is generic, there
is a p ∈ G ∩D. If p ∗ ¬(π ∈ Σ ↔ π ∈ Γ)} for some 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ
then by induction ¬(πG ∈ ΣG ↔ πG ∈ ΓG) for some 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ.
But this is a contradiction to ΣG = ΓG and so P ∗ Σ = Γ.
“←” Assume that there is p ∈ G (p ∗ Σ = Γ). By Definition 4 it
follows that for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ P ∗ (π ∈ Σ ↔ π ∈ Γ). Then by
induction πG ∈ ΣG ↔ πG ∈ ΓG for all 〈π, r〉 ∈ Σ ∪ Γ. So ΣG = ΓG.
ϕ ∧ ψ “→” Assume that (M, C)[G] |= ϕ∧ψ iff (M, C)[G] |= ϕ and (M, C)[G] |=
ψ. Then by induction ∃p ∈ G P ∗ ϕ and ∃q ∈ G, q ∗ ψ and we
know that ∃r ∈ G(r ≤ p and r ≤ q) such that r ∗ ϕ and r ∗ ψ and
so by Definition 4 r ∗ ϕ ∧ ψ.
“←” Assume ∃p ∈ G, p ∗ ϕ ∧ ψ, then p ∗ ϕ and p ∗ ψ. So
(M, C)[G] |= ϕ and (M, C)[G] |= ψ and therefore (M, C)[G] |= ϕ ∧ ψ.
¬ϕ “→” Assume that (M, C)[G] |= ¬ϕ. D = {p | p ∗ ϕ or p ∗ ¬ϕ}
is dense (using Lemma 17 and Definition 4). Therefore there is a
p ∈ G ∩D and by induction p ∗ ¬ϕ.
“←” Assume that there is p ∈ G such that p ∗ ¬ϕ. If (M, C) |= ϕ
then by induction hypothesis there is a q ∈ G such that q ∗ ϕ. But
then also r ∗ ϕ for some r ≤ p, q and this is a contradiction because
of Definition 4. So (M, C) |= ¬ϕ.
∀Xϕ “→” Assume that (M, C)[G] |= ∀Xϕ. Following the lines of the “→”-
part of the proof for Σ = Γ, there is a dense D = {p | either p ∗
∀Xϕ or for some σ, p ∗ ¬ϕ(σ)}. By induction we show that the sec-
ond case is not possible and so it follows that p ∗ ∀Xϕ.
“←” By induction.
Lemma 19. ∗=
Proof. p ∗ ϕ(σ1, . . . , σn) → p  ϕ(σ1, . . . , σn) follows directly from the
Truth Lemma. For the converse we use Lemma 17 c) and note that we
assumed the existence of generics. Then from ¬p ∗ ϕ(σ1, . . . , σn) it follows
that for some q ≤ p, q ∗ ¬ϕ(σ1, . . . , σn) and so ¬p ⊢ ϕ(σ1, . . . , σn).
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5 The Extension fulfills the Axioms
We have shown that in MK we can prove the Definability Lemma without
restricting the forcing notion as we have to do when working with A-definable
class-forcing in ZFC. Unfortunately we do not have the same advantage
when proving the preservation of the axioms. For example, when proving
the Replacement Axiom we have to show that the range of a set under a
class function is still a set and this does not hold in general for class-forcings.
In [3] two properties of forcing notions are introduced, namely pretameness
and tameness. Pretameness is needed to prove the Definability Lemma and
show that all axioms except Power Set are preserved. For the Power Set
Axiom this restriction needs to be strengthened to tameness. Let us give
the definitions in the MK context:
Definition 20 (Pretameness). D ⊆ P is predense ≤ p ∈ P if every q ≤ p
is compatible with an element of D.
P is pretame if and only if whenever 〈Di | i ∈ a〉 is a sequence of dense classes
in M, a ∈M and p ∈ P then there exists a q ≤ p and 〈di | i ∈ a〉 ∈M such
that di ⊆ Di and di is predense ≤ q for each i.
Definition 21. q ∈ P meets D ⊆ P if q extends an element in D.
A predense ≤ p partition is a pair (D0,D1) such that D0∪D1 is predense
≤ p and p0 ∈ D0, p1 ∈ D1 → p0, p1 are incompatible. Suppose 〈(D
i
0,D
i
1) | i ∈
a〉, 〈(Ei0, E
i
1) | i ∈ a〉 are sequences of predense ≤ p partitions. We say that
they are equivalent ≤ p if for each i ∈ a, {q | q meets Di0 ↔ q meets E
i
0} is
dense ≤ p. When p = 1P we omit ≤ p.
To each sequence of predense ≤ p partitions ~D = 〈(Di0,D
i
1)|i ∈ a〉 ∈ M
and G is P -generic over 〈M, C〉, p ∈ G we can associate the function
fG~D : a→ 2
defined by f(i) = 0↔ G∩Di0 6= ∅. Then two such sequences are equivalent
≤ p exactly if their associated functions are equal, for each choice of G.
Definition 22 (Tameness). P is tame iff P is pretame and for each a ∈M
and p ∈ P there is q ≤ p and α ∈ ORD(M) such that whenever ~D =
〈(Di0,D
i
1)|i ∈ a〉 ∈ M is a sequence of predense ≤ q partitions, {r |
~D is
equivalent ≤ r to some ~E = 〈(Ei0, E
i
1) | i ∈ a〉 in V
M
α } is dense below q.
Theorem 23. Let (M, C) be a model of MK. Then, if G is P -generic over
(M, C) and P is tame then (M, C)[G] is a model of MK.
Proof. Extensionality and Foundation follow becauseM [G] is transitive (see
Lemma 9 d) ; axiom 2 and 3 from Definitions 4 and 6. For Pairing, let
σG1 , σ
G
2 be such that σ1, σ2 ∈ N
s. Then the interpretation of the name
σ = {〈σ1, 1
P 〉, 〈σ2, 1
P 〉} in the extension gives the desired σG = {σG1 , σ
G
2 }.
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Infinity follows because ω exists in (M, C) and the notion of ω is absolute to
any model, ω ∈ (M, C)[G]. Union follows as in the set-forcing case.
Replacement: This follows as in [3] from the property of pretameness and
we give the proof to make clear where the property of pretameness is needed:
Suppose that F : σG →M [G]. Then for each σ0 of rank < rankσ the class
D(σ0) = {p | for some τ, q  σ0 ∈ σ → F (σ0) = τ} is dense below p, for some
p ∈ G which forces that F is a total function on σ. We now use pretameness
to “shrink” this class to a set: so for each q ≤ p there is an r ≤ q and
α ∈ Ord(M) such that Dα(σ0) = {s | s ∈ V
M
α and for some τ of rank <
α, s  σ0 ∈ σ → F (σ0) = τ} is predense ≤ r for each σ0 of rank < rank σ.
Then it follows by genericity that there is a q ∈ G and α ∈ Ord(M) such
that q ≤ p and Dα(σ0) is predense ≤ q for each σ0 of rank < rankσ. So let
π = {〈τ, r〉 | rank τ < α, r ∈ VMα , r  τ ∈ ran(F )} and then it follows that
ran(F ) = πG ∈M [G].
Power Set: This follows from tameness as shown in [3].
Class-Comprehension: Let Γ = {〈σ, p〉 ∈ N s ×P | p  ϕ(σ,Σ1, . . . ,Σn)}.
Because of the Definability Lemma, we know that Γ ∈ N . By Definition 4
and 6, ΓG = {σG | ∃p ∈ G(〈σ, p〉 ∈ Γ)} and we need to check that this equals
the desired Y = {x | (ϕ(x,ΣG1 , . . . ,Σ
G
n ))
(M,C)[G]}. So let σG ∈ ΓG. Then
by the definition of ΓG we know that p  ϕ(σ,Σ1, . . . ,Σn) and because of
the Truth Lemma it follows that (M, C)[G] |= ϕ(σG,ΣG1 , . . . ,Σ
G
n ). For the
converse, let x ∈ Y . By the Truth Lemma, ∃p ∈ G(p  ϕ(π,Σ1, . . . ,Σn),
where π is a name for x. By definition of Γ, 〈π, p〉 ∈ Γ.
Global Choice: Let <M denote the well-order of M and let σx, σy be the
least names for some x, y ∈ M [G]. As the names are elements of M , we
may assume that σx <M σy. So we define the relation <G in M [G] using M
and <M as parameters, so that x <G y iff σx <M σy for the corresponding
least names of x and y. Let R = {(x, y) |x, y ∈ M [G] and x <G y}. Then
by Class-Comprehension the class R exists.
[3] gives us a simple sufficient condition for tameness that translates
directly into the context of MK:
Definition 24. For regular, uncountable κ > ω, P is κ-distributive if when-
ever p ∈ P and 〈Di | i < β〉 are dense classes, β < κ then there is a q ≤ p
meeting each Di (p meets D if p ≤ q ∈ D for some q).
P is tame below κ if the tameness conditions hold for P with the added
restriction that Card(a) < κ.
Lemma 25. If P is κ-distributive then P is tame below κ.
Proof. Analogous to set-forcing 6.
6See [3], page 37.
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6 Laver’s Theorem
In the following we will give an example which shows that a fundamental
theorem that hold for set-forcing can be violated by tame class-forcings.
Laver’s Theorem, as published in [5], shows that for a set-generic exten-
sion V ⊆ V [G], V |= ZFC with the forcing notion P ∈ V and G is P -generic
over V , V is definable in V [G] from parameter Vδ+1 (of V ) and δ = |P |
+
in V [G]. This result makes use of the fact that every such forcing extension
has the approximation and cover properties as defined in [4] and relies on
certain results for such extensions.
In general, the same does not hold for class-forcing. In fact there are
class-forcings such that the ground model is not even second-order definable
from set-parameters:
Theorem 26. There is an MK-model (M, C) and a first-order definable,
tame class-forcing P with G P-generic over (M, C) such that the ground
modelM is not definable with set-parameters in the generic extension (M, C)[G].
Proof. We are starting from L. For every successor cardinal α, let Pα be
the forcing that adds one Cohen set to α: Pα is the set of all functions p
such that
dom(p) ⊂ α, |dom(p)| < α, ran(p) ⊂ {0, 1}.
Let P be the Easton product of the Pα for every successor α: A condition
p ∈ P is a function p ∈ L of the form p = 〈pα : α successor cardinal〉 ∈
Πα succ.Pα (p is stronger then q if and only if p ⊃ q) and p has Easton
support: for every inaccessible cardinal κ, | {α < κ | p(α) 6= ∅} | < κ. Then
P is the forcing which adds one Cohen set to every successor cardinal.
Let P = P × P = Πα succPα × Πα succPα be the forcing that adds
simultaneously two Cohen sets to every successor cardinal.7 Note that
Πα succ.Pα × Πα succ.Pα is isomorphic to Πα succ.Pα × Pα. Let G be P-
generic. Then G = Πα succ.G0(α) × G1(α) and we let G0 = Πα succ.G0(α)
and G1 = Πα succ.G1(α) with G0, G1 P -generic over L. We consider the
extension L[G0] ⊆ L[G0][G1] and we will show, that L[G0] is not definable
in L[G0][G1] from parameters in L[G0].
The reason that we cannot apply Laver’s and Hamkins’ results of [5] to
this extension is that it does not fulfill the δ approximation property8: As
the forcing adds a new set to every successor, the δ approximation property
cannot hold at successor cardinals δ: the added Cohen set is an element of
7It follows by a standard argument that P is pretame (and indeed tame) over (M, C),
see [3].
8A pair of transitive classes M ⊆ N satisfies the δ approximation property (with δ ∈
CardN) if whenever A ⊆M is a set in N and A ∩ a ∈M for any a ∈M of size less than
δ in M , then A ∈ M . For models of set theory equipped with classes, the pair M ⊆ N
satisfies the δ approximation property for classes if whenever A ⊆ M is a class of N and
A ∩ a ∈M for any a of size less than δ in M , then A is a class of M .
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the extension and a subset of the ground model and all of its < δ approxi-
mations are elements of the ground model but the whole set is not.
Note that the forcing is weakly homogeneous, i.e. for every p, q ∈ P
there is an automorphism π on P such that π(p) is compatible with q.
This is because every Pα is weakly homogeneous (let π(p) ∈ Pα such that
dom(π(p)) = dom(p) and π(p)(λ) = q(λ) if λ ∈ dom(p) ∩ dom(q) and
π(p)(λ) = p(λ) otherwise, then π is order preserving and a bijection) and
therefore also P is weakly homogeneous (define π componentwise using the
projection of p to pα). Similar for P × P .
To show that L[G0] is not definable in L[G0][G1] with parameters, assume
to the contrary that there is a set-parameter a0 such that L[G0] is definable
by the second-order formula ϕ(x, a0) in L[G0][G1] from a0. Let α be such
that a0 ∈ L[G0 ↾ α,G1 ↾ α]. Now consider a = G0(α
+), the Cohen set
which is added to α+ in the first component of P. a is Pα+ -generic over
L[G0↾α,G1↾α] and as a is an element of L[G0] the formula ϕ holds for a.
So we also know that there is a condition q ∈ G such that q  ϕ(a˙, a0).
Now we construct another generic G∗ = G∗0 × G
∗
1 which produces the
same extension but also an element for which ϕ holds and which is not an
element of L[G0]. This new generic adds the same sets as G, but we switch
G0 and G1 at α
+ so that the set added by G1(α
+) is now added in the new
first component G∗0. However we have to make sure that the new generic
respects q so that ϕ is again forced in the extension. We achieve this by
fixing the generic G on the length of q(α+) (we can assume that the length
is the same on G0 and G1).
It follows that q ∈ G∗0×G
∗
1 and because of weakly homogeneity G
∗
0×G
∗
1
is generic and L[G0][G1] = L[G
∗
0][G
∗
1]. Because of the construction of G
∗,
the formula ϕ(x, a0) holds for the set b = G
∗
0(α
+) but b is not an element of
L[G0]. That is a contradiction!
We have seen that there are different ways of approaching class-forcing,
namely on the one hand as definable from a class parameter A in a ZFC
model (M,A) and on the other hand in the context of an MK model (M, C).
That presents us with three notions of genericity: set-genericity, A-definable
class genericity and class-genericity. One of the questions that arises now is
in which way we can define the next step in this “hierarchy” of genericity. To
answer this question, Sy Friedman and the author of this paper are currently
working on so-called hyperclass-forcings in a variant of MK, i.e. forcings in
which the conditions are classes (see [1]). We will show in which context
such forcings are definable and which application they have to class-theory.
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